RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AND PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION THERETO.

COMES NOW the Respondent, John Howard Lindorfer, an adult resident of the State of Mississippi, not an attorney or member of the bar of any state, currently residing in Long Beach, within the First Judicial District, in accordance with Article 3, Section 25 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, to request the Court to consider the following facts and assertions, to wit:

I. RESPONDENT HAS AN INTEREST IN THIS MATTER

A. "Members" Not Defined.

Plaintiffs have identified themselves in the Complaint and Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Juristiction and their subsequent Memorandum thereto as "Members of the congregation of St. Paul Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Mississippi," "Members of St. Paul," or simply "Members" without defining in any way in what their membership consists, how they became members, in what manner they are members currently, what act or event established or might at some future time serve to terminate their membership, to what degree they are now "Members," or who else might also be "Members;" or who has or might have the authority to establish, determine, define, qualify or terminate their "Membership," with respect to whatever meaning the term "Members" has in the complaint. Much of the Plaintiffs discussion appears to assume what, whatever "Member" or "Members" means, they are the sole members, and that they collectively represent the total membership of the parish, or congregation, or group of "Members" affected by this cause, to the exclusion of all other persons or legal entities whomsoever.

B. Plaintiffs Identify Themselves as "Members."

Indeed, all of the allegations by the Plaintiffs concerning whether the Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiffs, as "Members," whether misrepresenations were made to the "Members," whether Plaintiffs, as "Members" are entitled to accounting from Defendants, whether Plaintiffs are entitled as "Members" to recover damages, or whether Plaintiffs as "Members" have other rights with respect to the actions of Defendants rests upon the definition of "Members" with respect to this Cause. The use of the term "Members" in the Complaint, however, is evidence that the terms has some meaning to the Plaintiffs, and therefore precisely what that meaning is understood to be to them is a matter of fact into which the Court may legitimately inquire, should it choose to do so.

C. Implications of being a "Member" are Not Clear.

Plaintiffs have failed to provide any substantive evidence to enable the Court, or indeed, anyone else, to determine, by using neutral principles of law, what the meaning of the term "Members" is in this context. Therefore, the implications of being a "Member," whatever they are, have not been revealed to this Court. Respondent maintains that the use of the term "Members" with respect to a religious organization or entity, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, St. Paul Catholic Parish, or Holy Family Catholic Parish, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, must be presumed by the State to be inextricably linked to matters of church membership, religion, and ecclesiastical authority and activity into which the Court is not allowed to intrude, in accordance with the Church Autonomy Doctrine and, more generally, by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

D. Respondent Must Be Assumed to be a "Member" if Plaintiffs are "Members."

Notwithstanding the above, Respondent avers that he has attended religious services at St. Paul's Church for many years, including the Sunday just before the St. Paul's Church building was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, that he has contributed substantially to parish collections during that time, that all four of his children attended St. Paul's School, that his youngest son was baptized in St. Paul's Church by the pastor, and that he was given permission to be a "Member" of St. Paul's Parish personally by the Bishop of Biloxi at that time, the Most Reverend Joseph Lawson Howze. Respondent submits to the court that by virtue of these considerations, and absent legally recognizable evidence to the contrary, he should be considered by this Court to be essentially as much a "Member" as the Plaintiffs, whatever the word means to them, and that the rights, duties, privileges, immunities and obligations which the Plaintiffs claim as "Members" of St. Paul Parish apply equally to him.

E. Degree of "Membership" Not At Issue.

Respondent recognizes that the Plaintiffs may, and probably do, consider themselves to be "Members" more fully, or of a higher rank or class, or of a more intimate, privileged, favored or exclusive association, as a result of which they have rights, duties, privileges, immunities and obligations which are not shared by Respondent. However, absent evidence to the contrary, Responent maintains that no such disparity exists, and that the Court should presume the same. Given the present lack of definition of the term "Members," the burden of proof that Respondent and other former parishioners of St. Pauls Parish or current parishioners of Holy Family Parish are not "Members" to the same extent and degree as Plaintiffs, lies with Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have failed to provide such proof.

F. Plaintiffs Are Not Sole "Members"

Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot maintain that they are the sole members, or that they collectively represent the total membership of any parish, since Respondent must be presumed to be another such "Member." This presumption is supported by Plaintiffs' use of the term "other Members" in items 3 (Page 34) and 9 (Page 35) of the Requested Relief.

G. Respondent Is Not A Plaintiff.

Respondent is manifestly not a Plaintiff. Respondent is not named as a Plaintiff in the Complaint, is not represented by Plaintiff's Counsel, and, in fact, does not agree with the Complaint, the allegations contained in the Complaint, or the requested relief.

H. Respondent Is Not A Defendant.

Respondent is also not a named Defendant or formally associated in any way, except as a "Member," with the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, the former St. Paul Catholic Parish, or the former St. Paul Catholic Church.

I. Respondent Has a Legitimate Interest in This Cause.

Nevertheless, Respondent has a legitimate equitable interest in this Cause, the proceedings associated with it, and its outcome as promulgated by the decisions of this Court; specifically:

1. Plaintiffs have requested adjudication that Defendants have held and/or are holding the Church Site, and the aforesaid insurance proceeds, donations, gifts, charitable contributions in trust for Plaintiffs (only) as "Members" of the congregation of St. Paul Catholic Church, and that Defendants have a fiduciary duty to act in the best exclusive interests of Plaintiffs. Such adjudication would serve the interests of the Plaintiffs to the detriment of those of the Respondent. Respondent maintains that the aforesaid insurance proceeds, donations, gifts and charitable contributions should not be held in trust for Plaintiffs, or anyone else, but should be used by the Pastor of Holy Family Parish and the Bishop of Biloxi as they consider appropriate, in accordance with Respondents beliefs and religious practices. Respondent further maintains that Defendants do not have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of Plaintiffs. Adjudication as requested by the Plaintiffs would therefore be an impermissible invasion of the State into Respondent's religious freedom.

2. Plaintiffs have requested adjudication that Defendants owe Plaintiffs a duty to prudently hold, manage and/or distribute any assets held by them in trust for the benefit of St. Paul, St. Paul Church, the remainder of the Church Site, and all of the insurance proceeds, donations, gifts, charitable contributions and grants received for St. Paul and/or St. Paul Church. Further, Plaintiffs have requested that Defendants should be required to use said monies for and on behalf of St. Paul and/or St. Paul Church, and should be prohibited from causing said monies to be diverted from St. Paul to the Lourdes Complex and from selling, encumbering and/or hypothecating the Church Site. Such adjudication would create a duty of Defendants with respect only to Plaintiffs not shared by other "Members," including Respondent, and would substantially impair the ability of Defendants to provide Respondent to a place of worship at the Lourdes Complex. Furthermore, prohibition of Defendants from selling, encumbering and/or hypothecating the Church Site would deprive Respondent and other "Members" of the financial benefits which may be derived from such selling, encumbering and/or hypothecating the Church Site, which has heretofore been operated and maintained by contributions made by Respondent and other "Members."

3. Plaintiffs have requested adjudication that Defendants actions, omissions and proposed future plans were and are not in the best interests of Plaintiffs, and the other "Members," and such actions, omissions and plans deviate from the standard of care required of Defendants, as trustees, and additionally constitute a beach of Defendants' alleged fiduciary duties. Such adjudication would favor the interests of Plaintiffs over those of Respondent and other "Members," whose opinions, wishes, desires, beliefs, actions, plans and goals have not been addressed in this Cause and may, like those of Respondent, be contrary and antithetical to those of Plaintiffs.

4. Plaintiffs have requested adjudication that Plaintiffs detrimentally relied upon the statements of Defendants, and incurred damages as a result of this reliance. Such adjudication would favor the interests of Plaintiffs over those of Respondent and other "Members" who may also have relied upon Defendants' statements, and who may also have been damaged to the same, or even greater, degree than Plaintiffs, and whose claims have not been heretofore been presented to this Court.

5. If it is determined that Defendants have or had a fiduciary duty and that they breached such fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have requested award of all of their damages sustained as a result of such breach. Such award would result in an unanticipated expenditure of funds by Defendants, including funds donated by Respondent and the other "Members" for Defendants' ministry, and would therefore deprive Respondent and the other "Members" of the rightful benefits of their own donations. Furthermore, award of damages to Plaintiffs (only) would result in reduction of funds available for damages to Respondent and other "Members" who may have been similarly damaged and are entitled to similar relief.

6. If it is determined that Defendants are acting as trustees for and on behalf of Plaintiffs, such determination would recognize a relationship with Plaintiffs not shared by Respondent and other "Members." This would establish Plaintiffs as a favored, exclusive class to whom Defendants would be obligated to defer in the execution of their ministerial and ecclesiastical duties to the detriment of Respondent and other "Members." However, if it is determined that Defendants are acting as trustees for and on behalf of Plaintiffs (only) Plaintiffs have requested the Court to enjoin Defendants from changing the use of the Chuch Site, or any portion thereof, from a parochial use to a secular use, from diverting any funds, monies, donations, gifts, charitable conteributions and/or grants from St. Paul, St. Paul Church or the Church Site to any other purpose. This would deprive Respondent and other "Members" of their right to the benefits of the appropriate use of the Church Site and funds, monies, donations, gifts, charitable conteributions and/or grants from St. Paul Parish or St. Paul Church, which are now assumed to be available for the use by Holy Family Parish for the benefit of its parishioners, including Respondent.

7. Plaintiffs have rquested that this Court order Defendants to utilize the funds held in trust by them (if any) for St. Paul for the repairing of St. Paul Church in a manner mutually agreeable with Plaintiffs. Whether or not any funds are held in trust for St. Paul or for the repairing of St. Paul Church is a matter yet to be decided by this Court. However, if the Court finds that such funds are held in trust for such purpose, ordering Defendants actually to use such funds for that purpose, would require the Pastor of Holy Family Parish, and the Bishop of Biloxi, to devote valuable time and effort to the refurbishment of a Catholic Church that would have no liturgical function. Furthermore, it would establish Plaintiffs as a favored, exclusive group of persons whose agreement would have to be secured by the Bishop and Pastor prior to any decisions regarding the repairing of the Church Building regardless of the wishes of others, including Respondent, who might be equally affected by such agreements or decisions and who, like Respondent, disagree vehemently with Plaintiffs in this regard.

8. Plaintiffs have rquested that this Court require Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with an accounting from August 29, 2005 through the date of this Court's Order, of any and all insurance proceeds, monies, tithes, donations, gifts, charitable contributions and grants received or held by Defendants, St. Paul, St. Paul Parish, and/or/ St. Paul Catholic Elementary School for and on behalf of the Members of St. Paul, St. Paul Church, the Church Site, and St. Paul Catholic Elementary School, and/or in any way relating to or accruing from the damage sustained to St. Paul and/or St. Paul Church and/or for the repair or recovery of St. Paul, St. Paul Church, the Church Site and/or St. Paul Catholic Elemtnary School. In view of the chaotic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, it would be difficult, time consuming and possibly impossible for such an accounting to be made. It would certainly require substantial time and effort on the part of the Pastor of Holy Family Parish and the Biship of Biloxi, which would detract from their attention to their spiritual ministry to Defendant and the other "Members." This would be an impermissible intrusion of the State into the spiritual and ministerial relationship between Respondent and his Pastor and Bishop, and their relationships with the other "Members." Requiring Defendants to provide this information to Plaintiffs (only), even if it could be done, would constitute Plaintiffs as a favored, exclusive group of persons to whom (alone) Defendants would be responsible for such accounting, to the detriment of Respondent and other other "Members" who may be equally, or perhaps more, affected by financial decisions made by Defendants.

9. Should it be dermined that Defendants have contacted the donors of funds, monies, tithes, donations, gifts, charitable contributions and/or grants to obtain permission to change the purpose of such donations, gifts, charitable contributions and/or grants and divert the same to another purpose, Plaintiffs have requested adjudication that Defendants breached their alleged fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs and Defendants are required to replace any diverted funds and to compensate Plaintiffs for any and all losses incurred by them and the other Members. Such adjudication would compensate only Plaintiffs not only for losses incurred by them, but also those incurred by other "Members," including Respondent, and would establish Plaintiffs as the sole recipients and beneficiaries of compensation for Defendants' breach of alleged fiduciary duties, in the unlikely event that such duties were shown to exist.

10. If this Court determines that any of the statements made by Rev. Carver were intentional misrepresentations made for the purpose of inducing charitable contributions, Plaintiffs have requested that they be awarded damages against such Defendants in the maximum amount allowed under Mississippi law, and if appropriate, award Plaintiffs punitive damages against such Defendants in the maximum amount allowed under Mississippi law. The only source of funding for such damages would be from the operating funds of Holy Family Parish and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. It would therefore take money donated by Respondent, the current parishioners of Holy Family Parish and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, as well as donations made by others for hurricane relief and the ministry, to Respondent and others, of the Pastor of Holy Family Parish and the Bishop of Biloxi, and put it in the pockets of Plaintiffs. This would deprive Respondent and other parishoners of the benefits for which this money was specifically donated in the exercise of their religious obligations to their ecclesiastical ministers for their ministry, thus punishing Respondent and others for the alleged misdeeds of Rev. Carver. Furthermore, it would create an incentive for any other parishioners who may in the future disagree with the administration of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, or any element or division thereof, to sue their pastor or Bishop in the hope of material gain, to the detriment of Respondent and other parishioners.

11. Plaintiffs have requested that this Court award Plaintiffs all of their costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of this Complaint. The only source of funding for such damages would be from the operating funds of Holy Family Parish and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. It would therefore take money donated by Respondent, the current parishioners of Holy Family Parish and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, as well as donations made by others for hurricane relief and the ministry, to Respondent and others, of the Pastor of Holy Family Parish and the Bishop of Biloxi, and put it in the pockets of Plaintiffs' attorneys. This would deprive Respondent and other parishoners of the benefits for which this money was specifically donated.

12. Respondent avers that the legal and ancillary expenses incurred by Defendants as the result of the necessity of defending themselves against the allegations of Plaintiffs in this Cause necessarily and appropriately have been provided out of the funds contributed by him and his fellow parishioners over the years for Defendants' ministry, during a time when such funds are desperately needed for the benefit of Respondent and other parishioners to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. Respondent believes that he has an interest in resolving this matter quickly to limit this hemorrhage of funds and hopefully to preclude the necessity for Defendants to sell assets they now hold, potentially including but not necessarily limited to the Church Site, to pay their legal expenses and obligations

13. Plaintiffs have brought this Cause in their own names, individually, and not in the name of a corporate body or group of persons, such as, for example, Save St. Paul's, Inc., which Respondent potentially might join after the fact to enjoy the benefits of the substantial pecuniary rewards that would accrue from the award of punitive damages against Defendants in the maximum amount allowed under Mississippi law which Plaintiffs are seeking. Respondent therefore has no hope or expectation of recovering, for the purpose for which it was donated, the losses incurred by him and his fellow parishioners represented by the award of damages solely to Plaintiffs.

In view of the foregoing, Respondent asserts that he has a legitimate interest in the Cause before this Court and its findings, and should be considered a party to this Cause and be heard by this Court in the same manner, and to the same degree, as Plaintiffs and Defendants, and should be afforded the same rights, privilieges, and immunities, including the right to be provided copies of all submissions and correspondence filed in this Cause, to present arguments and evidence, and to present, examine and cross examine witnesses, if any, to examine documentation submitted in this Cause, and to be notified in advance of Hearings so that he can attend them.

J. Respondent Has a Right To Represent Himself Pro Se.

This Court has already established a precident in this Cause by allowing Mr. Henry Kinney, Esq. an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but not in Mississippi. Mr. Kinney was permitted to offer oral argument in a Hearing of this Court on December 20, 2007. Respondent maintains that he should have the same right to represent himself pro se as Mr. Kinney, as neither of them is licensed to practice law in Mississippi. In addition:

1. Respondent is a retired senior citizen on a fixed income, living alone in that portion of Long Beach inundated by Hurricane Katrina. Respondence neither seeks nor expects to receive damages or other pecuniary benefit from these proceedings. Therefore, even if it would be possible to find an attorney willing to represent Respondent in this controversial and politically-charged Cause for a fee Respondent would be able to pay, such fee would constitute a severe financial hardship upon Respondent.

2. Respondent stipulates that Counsels for the Plaintiffs and Defense are qualified by their demonstrated education and expertise to present, explain and argue the questions of law which pertain to this Cause, and Respondent has the utmost confidence in this Court's ability correctly to interpret the law after duly considering such presentations, explanations and arguments. Respondent does not present or consider himself equally as qualified to argue questions of law as a person licensed to practice law in Mississippi. However, in addition to questions of law, this Cause also concerns questions of fact, of which, unlike Counsels, Respondent has personal knowledge, and considerations regarding the interpretations, conclusions and actions which a reasonable person might make, reach or take, respectively, given similar circumstances. Respondent considers himself to be equally a reasonable person, within the meaning of the law, as Counsels or Mr. Kinney.

3. Respondent also recognizes that his lack of education and expertise in legal matters, compared with Counsels and Mr. Kinney, may result in his submissions to this court having minor irregularities and peculiarities as a matter for which Plaintiffs, or Defendants, or both, may choose to challenge or request to be stricken from the Court record. While Respondent recognizes that upholding the law is of the highest importance to this Court, Respondent believes that this Court's desire to expose the truth of the matters brought before it in this Cause supercedes any argument to ignore elements of such truth in favor of minor irregularities of form, and that due attention to reason and respect for the truth will guard against allowing law to get in the way of doing the right thing.

3. Respondent therefore requests this Court to allow him to represent himself pro se as his only opportunity to have access to this Court in this Cause under Article 3, Section 25 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi.

4. Respondent maintains that this Court is his only protection and bulwark against the avaricious predations of Plaintiffs, who are represented at great cost by Counsel in the hope and expection of enormous pecuniary reward, "in the maximum amount allowed under Mississippi law," and many of whom, like Mr. Kinney, have the additional overwhelming benefits of wealth, influence, power and prestige within the community.

5. If this Court finds Respondent incompetent to appear before it in any other capacity, Respondent requests that he be heard as a Friend of the Court.

For these reasons, Respondent respectfully submits the following, to wit:

II. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

On August 10, 2007, this Court entered its Order denying Plaintiff's request for the Affidavit of Bishop Rodi to be stricken. In that Order, the Court determined that the issues before it can ultimately be summarized as follows:

1. Was title to the real property making up the Church Site conveyed to Bishop Rodi as trustee for the Plaintiffs, as members of the congregation of St. Paul Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Mississippi?

2. If this Court finds that Bishop Rodi, or any of the other Defendants, is in fact holding title to such property as trustee, do Defendants owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty with regard to their management of such property?

3. Do Defendants have the right to ignore the wishes and intentions of donors by diverting donations from their intended purpose to another purpose of Defendants' choosing?

III. STATEMENT AND REVIEW OF PERTINENT FACTS

A. ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY MAKING UP THE CHURCH SITE

The real property making up the Church Site, as referred to in this Cause, consists of 8 parcels of land described in Paragraphs VIII (Page 9) through XIV (Page 14) and Exhibits "A" through "C" of the Complaint.

1. Father Buteau Parcel

Plaintiffs aver that a portion of Parcel 1, described as the "Father Buteux Parcel" was acquired 1n 1849 by Fr. Louis Marie Stanislaus Buteux, Pastor of the original St. Paul Church, from Julian Herman as recorded in Deed Book 4, Page 196. Plaintiffs have not shown any subsequent transfer of title to this parcel. Plaintiffs aver (XII, Page 11) that "St. Paul and its members have used Parcel 1 for Divine Worship with the permission of Fr. Buteau since 1851," and maintain "that they and Defendants, as successors in interest to the original members of the congregation of St. Paul Catholic Church and the Catholic Diocese of Natchez, respectively, have the right to use Parcel 1 long as it remains a church."

Plaintiffs have failed to note that the original church built upon the site was destroyed and completely razed, and that the existing building was built subsequently. Therefore, the parcel has not "remained a church" by any reasonable definition, although admittedly it has been used by Defendants to erect and operate houses of worship. Plaintiffs have also failed to define "church" in this context. While this Court may speculate on what makes any particular edifice a "church," prudence and the Church Autonomy Doctrine would dictate that the Court accept the definition of the religious organization or agency that operates it. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the building referred to as "St. Paul's Church" is, in fact, now recognized as a "church" by the defining authority, namely the Defendants. Absent this recognition, Plaintiffs cannot justify their assertion that they have an interest in this property because "it remains a church."

Plaintiffs have also failed to present any evidence that they are equally "successors in interest" as Defendants. Title to the other parcels were conveyed to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez, Inc., and ultimately to Bishop Rodi, as will be shown hereinafter. Absent any record of transfer of title, it can be argued that the "successor in interest" is in fact, the successor to the office which Fr. Buteux held, that of Pastor of St. Paul's Parish, which is now held by one of the Defendants, Fr. Carver.

Plaintiffs aver that Defendants' change of use of this parcel is outside the scope of use granted by Fr. Buteau without any evidence whatever that Fr. Buteau "granted" the use to anyone for any purpose. Indeed, Plaintiffs' contention that they are 'successors in interest" is based on their failure to find record of such grant. Plaintiffs also contend, without justification, that Defendants' proposed change of the use of the land "would provide the heirs of Fr. Buteux with cause to terminate Plaintiffs' and Defendants' use..." Assuming that such heirs exist and chose to make an issue of their ownership of the land, Plaintiffs have failed to show in what way any particular use of the land would provide them with "cause" to "terminate Plaintiffs' and Defendants' use" that they would not otherwise have.

Since Plaintiffs have raised the matter, however, one might speculate about what would happen if such heirs arrived on Scenic drive to find a newly-reburbished church building standing empty and it was explained to them that, "the present pastor and bishop wanted to use the building as a community center after it was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, but a group of disgruntled former parishioners forced them to rebuild it as a church."

Plaintiffs maintain that they "and the other Members would be irreparably harmed if this occurred," without specifying how, or in what manner, either they or anyone else would be harmed by using a piece of land on which a severely damaged building is now located for a reasonable and legitimate purpose, rather than spending valuable funds to restore such building as a house of worship that would have no liturgical function. Respondent, who is equally a "Member," holds the opposite view, that it is reasonable and prudent to use the land for a purpose to which it could reasonably be put, and that he "and the other Members would be irreparably harmed" if funds now intended to be used for construction of new buildings safely further inland were to be wasted on rebuilding an useless house of worship that would have no other purpose than to appease the desires and sensibilities of the relatively small number of persons who are the Plaintiffs.

2. Parcels Transferred by Bishop Heslin to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez, Inc.

The Complaint describes parcel 1-A as conveyed by Fr. Buteux to Edward Saucier on October 13, 1849 through a deed filed in Deed Book 4, Page 518, included within the master conveyance referred to Paragraph XVI. Paragraph XVI refers to a conveyance of land by the Rt. Rev. Thomas Heslin, Bishop of Natchez, to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez on May 21st, 1906, filed in Book 73, Page 562 et seq. The Complaint states that it is attached as Exhibit "D, " but Exhibit "D" is actually a copy of Book 803, Pages 438 trhough 443, which records conveyance of land from The Most Reverend Joseph B. Brunini, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi, to the Most Reverend Joseph Lawson Howze, Bishop of the newly-established Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, upon his assumption of that ofice. The transfer of land by Bishop Heslin to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez is Exhibit "C" to the Complaint. This parcel of land appears to be that referred to as Tract Number XXIII in Exhibit "C," conveyed by Edward Saucer and wife Delphina to John Joseph Chanche, Catholic Bishop of Natchez by deed dated June 4, 1843, recorded in Book 1, Pages 345 and 346, afterwards conveyed to Thomas Heslin, Bishop of Natchez, by Francis Janssens, Bishop of Natchez by deed dated June 19, 1889, recorded in Book 24, page 410. Bishop Chanche died on July 22, 1852 in Frederick, Maryland, and was succeeded as Bishop of Natchez in 1853 by Bishop James Oliver Van de Velde, who served until his death in 1855. He was succeeded as Bishop of Natchez by Bishop William Henry Elder on May 3, 1857, who served until 1880, when he became the Archbishop of Cincinnati. He was succeeded as Bishop of Natchez by Bishop Francis Janssens in 1881. Plaintiffs have failed to show a transfer of this property from Bishop Chanche to Bishop Janssens.

The Complaint describes parcel 1-B as conveyed by Fr. Buteux to F. F. Bureau on October 13, 1849 through a deed filed in Deed Book 5, Page 125, included within the master conveyance referred to Paragraph XVI. This parcel of land appears to be approximately half of that referred to as Tract Number XXIV in Exhibit "C," conveyed by Francis Frederic Bereau and Eugenie Bereau to William Henry Elder, Catholic Bishop of Natchez by deed dated June 30, 1866, recorded in Book 10, Pages 35 and 36, afterwards conveyed to Thomas Heslin, Bishop of Natchez, by Francis Janssens, Bishop of Natchez by deed dated June 19, 1889, recorded in Book 37, pages 69 and 70. Plaintiffs have failed to show a transfer of this property from Bishop Elder to Bishop Janssens.

Another parcel previously owned by Fr. Buteux and identified in the Complaint as 1-C is "north of the Church Site."

The Complaint describes parcel 2 as acquired from Rev. and Mrs. Holton on September 27, 1871 through the deed filed of record in Book 13, Page 244. This parcel appears to be that referred to as Tract Number XXV in Exhibit "C," conveyed to William Henry Elder, Bishop of Natchez by Margaret Shannon and Thomas S. Elder, and subsequently conveyed to Thomas Heslin, Bishop of Natchez, by Francis Janssens, Bishop of Natchez by deed dated June 19, 1899, recorded in Book 24, page 410. Plaintiffs have failed to show a transfer of this property from Bishop Elder to Bishop Janssens.

The Complaint describes parcel 3 as acquired from the Curtis Family on September 12, 1887 through the deed filed of record in Book 22, Page 460. This parcel appears to be that referred to as Tract Number XXIX in Exhibit "C," conveyed to Francis Janssens, Bishop of Natchez, by Ellen Curtis, Mary A. Perry, J. P. Curtis, Johanna Curtis, Jno. J Curtis and P. Curtis, on September 21, 1887, and subsequently conveyed to Thomas Heslin, Bishop of Natchez, by Francis Janssens, Bishop of Natchez, by deed dated June 19, 1889, recorded in Book 24, page 363.

The Complaint describes parcel 4 as conveyed to Bishop Heslin in 1890 by John Straub and wife, Florence Straub, through the document filed of record in Deed Book 25, Page 78, and reconveyed with additional adjacent land to Bishop Heslin in 1891 through the document filed of record in Deed Book 27, Page 121. This parcel appears to be that referred to as Tract Number XXXII and Tract Number XXXIII in Exhibit "C."

The Catholic Diocese of Natchez, Inc., was incorporated on September 7, 1905. A copy of the Charter of Incorporation is identified in the Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction as part of Exhibit "B." Section 2 stated that "the object and purpose of this act of incorporation is to enable said corporation to hold in trust the titles to all the property, real and personal belonging to the several Catholic congregations, parishes and missions in the State of Mississippi, and to sell and convey the same in the manner and upon the conditions hereinafter defined." Section 5 further states, "Said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to lease, mortgage or to sell and to deal with any property of said several congregations, parishes and missions in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by the regulations of the Catholic Diocese of Natchez in Mississippi, relating to and governing the power and authority of the Bishop of Natchez in respect to conveyance by him, by lease, mortgage or sale of said property." Section 8 identified the Right Reverend Thomas Heslin as the chief officer of this corporation and further specified that "Upon death or removal of the present Bishop of Natchez his successors as Bishop shall become ispo facto his successors as chief official of this corporation, and so on during the life of this corporation..."

On May 21st, 1906, Bishop Heslin "sold and conveyed" the property described in the Indenture referred to in Paragraph XVI, Page 15, of the Complaint and recorded in Book 73, Page 562, et seq. to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez, Inc., "for the purpose of holding the titles of the property of the several Catholic Congregations, Parishes and Missions in the State of Mississippi, which have been held by the party of the first part in trust for said Congregations, Parishes and Missions, "To have and to hold all of said different properties to itself, the party of the second part, in fee simple and according to the trusts provided for in the charter of the said party of the second part..." (emphasis added)

On March 11, 1957, The Catholic Diocese of Natchez changed its name to "The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson," as recorded in the State Of Mississippi Executive Office, Book 70, Pages 254 through 257. The Minutes and Certificate were signed by Joseph B. Brunini as Secretary of the Corporation.

3. Parcels Transferred to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson.

Bishop Thomas Heslin served as Bishop of Natchez until 1911, when he was replaced by Bishop John Edward Gunn, S.M., who served as Bishop until1924. He was replaced by Bishop Richard Oliver Gerow, who served from1924 to 1967. During his tenure the Diocese was renamed the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson, ans subsequently to the Catholic Diocese of Jackson. Bishop Joseph Bernard Brunini became Bishop in 1967 and served until1984.

The Complaint describes parcel 6 as conveyed on April December 5, 1947, to "The Catholic Diocese of Natchez, in trust for St. Paul's congregation in Pass Christian, Mississippi," by the Wilfreda Margaret Gack, individually and as executrix of the Estate of Jane E. Hi,, Deceased, through warranty deed filed of record in Book 305, Page 197. The Bishop at that time was Richard Oliver Gerow.

The Complaint describes parcel 5 as conveyed on April 26, 1962, to "The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson, as trustee for St. Paul's congregation or parish in Pass Christian, Mississippi," by the St. Joseph Alumni Association, through warranty deed filed of record in Book 503, Page 526. The Bishop at that time was Richard Oliver Gerow.

The Complaint describes parcel 8 as conveyed on September 24, 1970, to "The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson, in trust for the congregation St. Paul Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Harrison County, Mississippi," by the Lutz Family, through warranty deed filed of record in Book 681, Page 478. The Bishop at that time was Joseph Bernard Brunini.

On July 11, 1977, during the tenure of Bishop Joseph Bernard Brunini, the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson changed its name to "The Catholic Diocese of Jackson," as recorded in the State Of Mississippi Executive Office, Book 236, Pages 188 through 191. The Minutes and Certificate were signed by Most Reverend Joseph B. Brunini, Bishop and Chief Officer.

4. Property Transferred to Bishop Joseph Lawson Howze as an individual.

As stated in Paragraph XVIII (Page 15) of the Complaint, upon the establishment of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi and the installation of Bishop Joseph Lawson Howze as its first Bishop, Bishop Brunini on June 6, 1977, transfered all property, "real, personal or mixed" which he personally held "as trustee for any parish or church institution located in the counties of Wayne, Jones, Covington, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Walthall, Marion, Lamar, Forest, Perry, Green, Stone, George, Pearl River, Hancock, Harrison and Jackson in the State of Mississippi," to the Most Reverend Joseph Lawson Howze personally, as Bishop of the newly-created Catholic Diocese of Biloxi which encompassed those counties. Bishop Brunini signed the Deed as "Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Jackson," even though the corporation then known as The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson did not change its name until July 11, over a month later. The Deed was filed of record in Book 803, pages 438, 439 and 440. Transfer was from Bishop Brunini personally as the Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Jackson to Bishop Howze personally as Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi "to perfect record title therefore to him." A copy of the Deed is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "D."

As stated in Paragraph XVIII (Page 15) of the Complaint, "In order to confirm and record the creation of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi and to perfect record title to lands located in Said Diocese in Most Reverend Joseph L. Howze as trustee, The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson," did "set over, assign, transfer, sell and convey unto the Most Reverend Joseph L. Howze, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, and his successors in office forever, as trustee for the use and benefit of the members of each Catholic Parish or Congregation located in the counties named... all property, real, personal or mixed, owned or claimed by the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson..." The Deed was signed by the Most Reverend Joseph B. Brunini as Bishop and Chief Officer, on June 6, 1977, and was filed of record in Book 803, pages 438, 439 and 440, and a copy is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "E."

Nearly two months after the transfer of title to property within the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi from Bishop Brunini, both personally as the Bishop of The Catholic Diocese of Jackson and in his capacity as the Chief Officer of the Mississippi non-profit corporation then known as The Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson to Bishop Howze personally, The Catholic Diocese of Jackson was divided into two Dioceses, the Catholic Diocese of Jackson, and the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. The Catholic Diocese of Biloxi was incorporated on August 4, 1977, as recorded in the State Of Mississippi Executive Office, Book 237, Pages 45 through 52. The Minutes were signed by Most Reverend Joseph L. Howze, Reverend Kevin Bambrick and Reverend James McGough, and the Certificate was signed by James P. McGough, Secretary.

On page 22 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Plaintiffs agree that "these deeds conveyed all of the property being held in trust for the various Catholic congregations situated in the Diocese of Biloxi unto Bishop Howze in trust for the respective Catholic Congregations." They go on to speculate on the reasons for Bishop Brunini's decision, but fail to mention that on the date of this conveyance, June 6, 1977, it would not have been possible for Bishop Brunini to transfer title to this property to the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, because that corporate entity did not exist until August 4, 1977, almost two months later.

The remaining parcel of land comprising "The Church Site" is described in the Complaint as parcel 7, conveyed on February 19, 1986, to "The Most Reverend Joseph Lawson Howze, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, in trust for the Catholic congregation and Parish of St. Paul, Pass Christian, Harrison County, Mississippi," by O. S. Montagnet, Jr., through warranty deed filed of record in Book 1034, Page 97. The Bishop at that time was Joseph Lawson Howze, the individual to whom title to the property was conveyed.

As noted in Paragraph XX, Page 16 of the Complaint, Bishop Howze retired in 2001 and The Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, Defendant, was installed as Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. As one of the his acts related to the transfer of his office as Bishop, Bishop Howze did "set over, assign, transfer, sell, convey and warrant all my right, title and interest" in "all property, real, personal or mixed" which he held as "trustee for any Parish, Congregation or Church institution located in" the counties comprising the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi "unto Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, and to his successors in office forever, TRUSTEE for the use and benefit of the members of each such Catholic Parish or Congregation in accordance with the Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church..." The General Warranty Deed was filed of record in Book 1548, pages 389, 390 and 391, and was signed by "Most Reverend Joseph Lawson Howze, Bishop Emeritus of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, TRUSTEE" A copy is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "F"

B. EFFECT OF WORDING OF CONVEYANCE DOCUMENTS TO BISHOP RODI.

It is obvious from all of these documents that they were intended to effect the conveyance of property from one person or corporate entity to another, and were so worded to have that effect. The chain of title and owernership terminated at the time of his installation in Bishop Rodi personally and individually, who received such property from Bishop Howze, personally and individually. These were legal documents, prepared and submitted according to the Laws of the State of Mississippi in effect at the time, for the purpose of conveying title to the real property ultimately to Bishop Rodi as an individual private citizen subject to the Laws of the State of Mississippi. Inquiry into their meaning and effect is proper to this Court under neutral principles of law on that basis.

However, neither Bishop Howze nor Bishop Rodi are only individual private citizens. In addition to their identity as private, individual citizens of the State of Mississippi, they are also Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, subject to Canon Law that is many centuries older and more mature than Mississippi Law, and in accordance with which they may have rights, duties, obligations, responsibilities, authority and immunities with respect to other persons subject to that law that neither the State of Mississippi nor this Court needs, nor, in fact, is permitted by the Church Autonomy Doctrine, to recognize. That Canon Law exists is a matter of fact that pertains to the Cause before this Court. Of what it consists; what rights, authority or immunities it confers; or what duties, obligations and responsibilities it imposes upon those who consider themselves subject to it, are outside the purview of this Court in accordance with the Church Autonomy Doctrine, and may be considered moot. To assert that the actions of Catholic Bishops are in no way different from those reasonably expected of other individuals who are not Catholic Bishops is to ignore a fundamental truth upon which this entire Cause hinges.

The possibility exists, therefore, that both Bishop Howze and Bishop Rodi may have reasonably taken or omitted actions because they are Catholic Bishops which an individual who is not a Catholic Bishop would not be reasonably expected to take, including the wording of legal documents required to fulfill the requirements of Mississippi Law. The Court may recognize the simple existence of this possibility without an impermissible inquiry into or finding regarding their purpose or effect in Canon Law. When the wording contained in such documents appears, but is not proved, to have a meaning or intent in accordance with Mississippi Law, this Court may reasonably consider that it has some other meaning or intent as well, without the necessity, nor, indeed, the authority, to determine what that meaning or intent is.

C. USE OF THE WORDS 'TRUST" AND "TRUSTEE"

In their zeal to find excuses to enrich themselves at the expense of their friends and neighbors, Plaintiffs have seized upon the meaning of the words "Trust," or "Trustee," as having no possible meaning other than that conferred by Title 91, "Trusts and Estates," of the Mississippi Code of 1972, As Amended. As the Court is no doubt aware, the word "trust" can have many meanings, among them:

1. Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing. 2. Custody; care. 3. Something committed into the care of another; charge. 4 The condition and resulting obligation of having confidence placed in a person or legal entity, or the person or legal entity in which confidence is placed. 5. Reliance on something in the future; hope. 6. Reliance on the intention and ability of a purchaser to pay in the future; credit. 7. A legal title to property held by one party for the benefit of another 8. The confidence reposed in a trustee when giving the trustee legal title to property to administer for another, together with the trustee's obligation regarding that property and the beneficiary 9. The property so held. 10. A combination of firms or corporations for the purpose of reducing competition and controlling prices throughout a business or an industry. 11. To have or place reliance; depend. 12. To be confident; hope. 13. To sell on credit. 14. To have or place confidence in; depend on. 15. To expect with assurance; assume. 16. To believe. 17. To place in the care of another; entrust. 18. To grant discretion to confidently. 19. To extend credit to.

Similarly, the word "trustee" commonly has the following meanings:

1. One, such as a bank, that holds legal title to property in order to administer it for a beneficiary. 2. A member of a board elected or appointed to direct the funds and policy of an institution.

The conveyance documents from Bishop Howze to Bishop Rodi were executed upon the termination of Bishop Howze's office of Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi and the assumption of that office by Bishop Rodi. While precisely what this office is, and of what it consists, is outside the purview of this Court, the word "Bishop" has been used so many times in such documents and in the Complaint and Response and Plaintiffs' subsequent Memorandum, that the Court may assume that is has some meaning, and that such documents, and all documents conveying property to their predecessors in office, were executed with that meaning, whatever it may be, in mind by those who executed them.

While Plaintiffs have assumed that the word "Trustee," in all cases in which it has been used in the property conveyance and acquisition documents means "One, such as a bank, that holds legal title to property in order to administer it for a beneficiary," as indeed it does under Title 91 of the Mississippi Code, this Court should consider that, as used in such documents, it may mean instead "A member of a board elected or appointed to direct the funds and policy of an institution," the member being, in this case, a Bishop and the institution, in this case, being the Roman Catholic Church or one of its subordinate divisions. Since this possibility exists, the burden of proof that the meaning is the one chosen for their benefit by the Plaintiffs is the only possible one for this Court to consider rests with the Plaintiffs. They have failed to meet this burden.

Plaintiff's own arguments provide evidence for supposing an alternate interpretation from the one they have advanced. In oral argument in a Hearing of this Court on December 20, 2007, Plaintiffs stated that, "If this were Hancock Bank, we wouldn't even be here," or words to that effect. Obviously, if Bishop Howze or Bishop Rodi were Hancock Bank, it would be reasonable to assume that the word "Trustee" means "One that holds legal title to property in order to administer it for a beneficiary" unless it could be shown that some alternate meaning was more appropriate. However, Bishop Howze and Bishop Rodi are manifestly not banks, they are Catholic Bishops, as noted time and again in every document related to this Cause that refers to them, and, as Plaintiffs have pointed out, the fact that they are not banks leaves the word "Trustee" when applied to them open to interpretation of meanings other than only that that would be presumed to apply to a bank or other person or legal entity reasonably assumed to be conducting business operations in accordance with Title 91 of the Mississippi Code.

In their valiant attempts to serve both masters, Bishop Howze and Bishop Rodi have been forced by both Mississippi Law and their ecclesiastical offices and duties to straddle the impenetrable wall of separation between Church and State. In interpreting their actions, it is not necessary for this Court to attempt to scale that wall and peer into the tangled, thorny thicket of Catholic belief, Canon Law and Christian tradition that is presumably the home of Defendants' dominions and fiefdoms, if any. It is necessary and sufficient for this Court to recognize that there is in fact another side, and that all of Defendant's actions or omissions, and those of the persons who are associated with them by reason of their ministry and ecclesiastical offices and duties, must be interpreted in light of that fact. The burden of proof of assertions that the Bishops' actions or omissions in the discharge of their ministries do or must have meaning and intent only on the side of that wall on which this Court has interest and over which it has juridsiction, and on which Bishops Howze and Rodi are ordinary, private citizens before the Law, must rest on those making that claim. Therefore, the assertion that the terms "Trust" and "Trustee" must be applied to Bishop Howze and Bishop Rodi only in the sense in which they are used in Title 91 of the Mississippi Code must be proved by Plaintiffs in order to be accepted by this Court. This they have failed to do.

D. EFFECT OF OMISSION OF THE WORDS 'TRUST" AND "TRUSTEE" in CONVEYANCE DOCUMENTS.

It is instructive to examine the meaning of the various conveyance documents if the words "Trust" or "Trustee" had been omitted. The result in each and every case would have been that the real property to which title was conveyed to the various Bishops (but not necessarily to their Dioceses as corporate entities) was conveyed for any purpose whatever. Thus, in such a hypothetical situation, the Bishops, as private citizens before the Law, could lawfully have sold such property and used all of the proceeds thereof to gamble at the casinos, bet on the horses, or patronize brothels in Nevada. It was clearly not the intention of the donors and grantors to convey the property involved for such frivolous and self-centered purposes. Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the use of the terms "Trust" and "Trustee" were intended in each and every case to indicate that such property was being conveyed with the intent that it should be used "for the use and benefit" of the persons and congregations the Bishops serve in the execution of the duties of their ecclesiastical offices. What those duties may be under Canon Law is not a permissible area of inquiry or judgement of this Court. What they might be under Mississippi Law, of course, is. Plaintiffs have failed to show what specific duties they are or might be, under Mississippi Law, except to assert that they are "fiduciary" in nature. Absent any description of any duties recognizable under Mississippi Law, Plaintiffs have failed to prove that Defendants have any fiduciary duties or responsibilities to them.

Plaintiffs have also not shown that it was the intention of the grantors and donors of any of the property conveyed "in Trust" to have the use of such property, control over it, or decision about what constitutes appropriate "use and benefit" of the "Members" or of the "Parish" or "Congregations" decided by any group or association of persons who are not clergy, certainly not the limited and exclusive group comprising only the Plaintiffs.

Unlike the property conveyed by Bishop Heslin to the Catholic Diocese of Natchez as from a private individual to a corporate entity, Bishop Brunini did not itemize the property conveyed by him, both as a Bishop of the Catholic Church (Exhibit "D" to the Complaint) and as Chief Officer of the Mississippi Corporation known as the Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson (Exhibit "E" to the Complaint) to Bishop Howze. Individually, Bishop Brunini set over, assigned, transferred, sold, and conveyed to Bishop Howze "as trustee for the use and benefit of the members of each such Catholic Parish or Congregation all property, real, personal or mixed" which he held "as trustee for any parish or church institution located in" the Mississippi counties comprising the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. As Chief Officer, Bishop Brunini set over, assigned, transferred, sold, conveyed and warranted to Bishop Howze, "as trustee for the use and benefit of the members of each Catholic Parish or Congregation, located in the counties named below for which said property is now used all property, real, personal or mixed, owned or claimed by the Catholic Diocese of Natchez_jackson, a Mississippi non-profit corporation, located in the counties" which comprised the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi. Had Bishop Brunini failed to incorporate the trust and trustee language, such transfers would have been effective for all of Bishop Brunini's personal property anywhere in the world, including his home, automobile, pointy hat, tee shirts, Argyle golfing socks, and Jockey shorts, even those stored in the homes of members of his extended family.

The same consideration applies to the conveyance of "All property, real, personal or mixed" located within his former Diocese from Bishop Howze, personally, to Bishop Rodi, personally. Absent the trust language, execution of this document would legally have left Bishop Howze naked, homeless and penniless in the Catholic Diocese of which he had become the "Bishop Emeritus," as noted in Exhibit "F," and in which he had been recognized by his fellow Catholics as its very first divinely-appointed Governor, a successor to the Apostles, and a shepherd of the People of God.

E. FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE ASSERTION THAT BISHOP HOWZE OR BISHOP RODI ARE "TRUSTEES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 91 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CODE.

The assertion that Bishop Howze or Bishop Rodi are "Trustees" within the meaning of Title 91 of the Mississippi Code fails on other grounds as well.

Plaintiffs assert on Page 18 of their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction that the conveyance documents at issue meet the statutory requirements for creating an express trust because they are in writing, executed by the respective grantors, were properly acknowledged, and were recorded in the public records as required by M.C.A SEC. 91-9-1. This assertion overlooks the fact that practically every legal document in the State, in order to be effective, must be similarly executed in writing by the person or persons creating them, must be acknowledged, and must be recorded in the Public record. This assertion, if true, would make any conveyance of any land for any purpose whatsoever the establishment of a trust if it meets the aforementioned requirements.

It does not appear from the wording of the documents that the grantors intended to create a Trust within the meaning of Title 91, M.C.A. Although each of the documents noted are manifestly conveyances and transfers of title to land, none of them mentions Title 91, as would be expected for the establishment of a Trust under Title 91. None of these documents specifies a name of the trust or the street and mailing address of the grantor or the office of his agent. Many of them do not show the name and street and mailing address of the alleged "Trustee." In the case of conveyance of the assets of the Bishops of Biloxi, there was no legally sufficient description of all interests in real property owned or conveyed. No anticipated date of termination of the trust was specified, and there was no enumeration of the general powers granted to the trustee.

Plaintiffs have apparently recognized these defects by suggesting in paragraph IV. b. i, Page 19 of their Memorandum that a resulting trust could have been created because St. Paul Congregation provided the money to acquire the church properties, and asserts on Page 19 that the parishioners, not the diocese or bishop, are responsible for the funding of operating the parish and satisfying its debts. Plaintiffs have failed to note, however, that contributions are made by parishioners almost exclusively for any use for which the Bishop or Pastor chooses to put them. While Plaintiffs have demonstrated that funds were solicited for specific purposes, they have not provided any evidence that any funds were donated or otherwise acquired by Bishop Howze or Bishop Rodi for the sole and specific purpose of purchasing real property. Indeed, Plaintiffs note in Paragraph III, Page 16, that the Supreme Court's decision in Harris is readily distinguishable from this one because "Harris is not a church property dispute in which the Defendants held property in trust for the benefit of its members, nor did it involved the alleged diversion of monies donated for specific purposes." However, whether Defendents hold property in trust or whether monies were donated for specific purposes are precisely among the issues to be decided in this Cause. Absent a finding that the properties in question are held in trust and, in addition, that monies were donated for specific purposes, this case is very much like Harris, and the conclusions in Harris, that the Court is being asked to review the day-to-day expenditures of the church, apply equally here.

The most glaring failure of Plaintiffs argument, however, is demonstrated by the Plaintiffs themselves. They have claimed that each grantee was a "Trustee" of property for the use and benefit of an otherwise unspecified group of persons who are variously identified as "Members" or Parishioners, among whom, or all of whom, are the Plaintiffs. However, this assertion cannot be supported in Law, as M.C.A. SEC. 91-9-109 states:

"The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire administration of the trust to a cotrustee or another."

If, as Plaintiffs claim, Bishop Brunini was a "Trustee" under Title 91, he would have had to become a grantor to convey the property under consideration to Bishop Howze as "Trustee", who would have had to undergo a similar magical transformation to convey the property to Bishop Rodi as "Trustee." Plaintiffs have failed utterly to even suggest how such a transformation could have taken place, much less to prove that it did.

Considering the foregoing, whatever "Trust" or Trustee" means to the Roman Catholic Church regarding the conveyance of Church assets to Bishop Rodi as one of its Apostolic Successors, it cannot have the meaning assigned by Title 91 under Mississippi Law, and therefore all subsequent argument of Plaintiffs based on that presumption are moot.

Plaintiffs have conclusively demonstrated that Defendants solicited funds for the rebuilding of St. Paul's Church, but they have not provided any evidence to this Court that any funds, gifts or contributions from anybody, certainly not from Plaintiffs, were actually donated to Defendants for that sole and specific purpose, and no other; or that such funds have not been, and will not be, used for repairing and refurbishing the Church building in a manner and to a degree what could reasonably be considered to be "rebuilding." Absent such evidence, Defendants cannot be found to have incurred any obligation to hold any funds "in Trust" for that purpose, or, in fact, that they are not doing so.

Regarding the establishment of a fiduciary relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs, such a relationship would be defined by the general powers granted to the Trustee in the instrument establishing the Trust, since no such Trust has been shown to exist, and Bishop Rodi has been shown not to be a "Trustee" under Title 91, Plaintiffs have failed also to demonstrate that Defendants have any fiduciary relationship to them.

F. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT "MEMBERS" OF THE CONGREGATION OF ST. PAUL CATHOLIC CHURCH, PASS CHRISTIAN, MISSISSIPPI.

Plaintiffs have argued a number of points on the assumption that they are "Members" of "St. Paul's," "St. Paul Parish," or simply, St. Paul." In order to lay these arguments to rest, Respondent maintains that they cannot now be "Members" of any Catholic Parish or Congregation in Pass Christian, Mississippi other than Holy Family Parish because there is no other Catholic Parish or Congregation in Pass Christian, Mississippi except Holy Family Parish, into which Our Lady of Lourdes Parish and St. Paul Parish were merged by Bishop Rodi, as noted in Paragraph XXXI, Page 20 of the Complaint. The Holy Family Parish Church, formerly Our Lady of Lourdes Church, is believed by Respondent actually to lie outside the city limits of Pass Christian. Nevertheless, Respondent and several of his fellow former parishioners of St. Paul's Parish, as well as many of the Plaintiffs, now attend services at Holy Family Church, f/k/a Our Lady of Lourdes Church. Plaintiffs maintain in Paragraph II, Page 8 of their Memorandum that they do not challenge the authority of the Defendants to merge St. Paul and Our Lady of Lourdes Parish. Simple logic shows that if Bishop Rodi had the authority to combine the two parishes, as Plaintiffs maintain, and if he actually did that, as they claim, then St. Paul Parish. like the Holy Roman Empire or the City of Troy, simply does not now exist.

That nobody can be a member of a Parish that does not exist appears to Respondent to be self-evident, yet Plaintiffs continue to assert their claim to the right to control the assets of the former Holy Family Parish formerly located in St. Paul's Parish as "Members" of St. Paul's Parish. In oral argument on December 20, Mr. Henry Kinney proposed what he referred to as the "poof factor," in which he appeared to assert that calling a former "Member" of St. Paul's Parish a "Member" of Holy Family Parish because the "Membership" of St. Paul's Parish, along with the "Membership" of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, was consolidated into the "Membership" of Holy Family Parish, was somehow akin to calling a chair a monkey, or vice versa, without apparently suggesting how the two actions might be reasonably compared or contrasted. Although Respondent was admittedly unable to follow Mr. Kinney's tortuous and convoluted reasoning, he appeared to maintain that once a person is a "Member" of an organization, he remains a "Member" of that organization forever. By this argument, Mr. Kinney is still a member of his freshman prelaw class, as well as the first grade class of whatever school he went to after kindergarten, which is patently absurd.

"Membership" in a Parish, Congregation or other religious organization or association appears to be one of those matters into which the Church Autonomy Doctrine prohibits this Court from intruding. However, Plaintiffs assertion that their "claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law and do not implicate the Church Autonomy Doctrine," as asserted in Paragraph III, Page 9 of their Memorandum, requires them to provide documentation or other evidence, which this Court can recognize and consider using neutral principles of law, that:

1. "Membership" is a condition recognizable by Mississippi Law,

2. Mississippi Law is able to distinguish between "Members" and non-Members.

3. That Plaintiffs became "Members" by some recognizable act, event or process, recognizable under Mississippi Law,

4. That such act, event or process actually conferred "Membership," as recognized by the State of Mississippi,

5. In what condition, quality or identity, recognizable under Mississippi Law their "Membership" consists,

6. What rights, privileges, powers, duties, obligations, benefits, authority or immunity, all recognizable by Mississippi Law, are conferred by such "Membership,"

6. To what extent or degree, recognizable under Mississippi Law, their "Membership" is or is not equivalent to that of other "Members,"

7. Who has the authority to grant, recognize, determine, defend, define, modify or terminate such "Membership,"

8. That their membership has not be terminated by some act or omission or by whatever person who has the authority or act, or event (such as, for example, marrying outside the Church, procuring an abortion, or suing a Bishop in Civil Court) that has the effect of doing that, and

9. Such "Membership" can be and in fact is in an organization that no longer exists.

Plaintiffs have not provided any such documentation or evidence.

Whatever "Membership" means, Plaintiffs appear to be equally as much "Members" of Holy Family Parish now as they were of St. Paul's Parish when it existed. Many of them attend worship services at Holy Family Church regularly, even daily. Many are, in fact extraordinary ministers and are frequently observed by Respondent acting in that capacity. If any of them have recently had their pictures included in the Holy Family Church Directory, they have at least made a conscious effort to identify themselves as "Members" of Holy Family Parish since its establishment by Bishop Rodi, and, furthermore, that they are not the only such "Members."

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' claim that they are "Members of the congregation of St. Paul Catholic Church, Pass Christian, Mississippi" should not be recognized by this Court.

G. PLAINTIFFS MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE PERSONS FOR WHOSE "USE AND BENEFIT" THE CHURCH SITE WAS ACQUIRED AND CONVEYED.

Absent evidence that the terms "use and benefit" in the conveyance documents ceased to have meaning when St. Paul's Parish was consolidated into Holy Family Parish by Bishop Rodi, such terms may be presumed by this Court to have some meaning with respect to those individuals who are "Members," whatever that means, of the religious congregation within the geographical boundaries of which, namely Holy Family Parish, the conveyed property lies. What those terms might mean in Canon Law is outside the perview of this Court. However, this Court may consider what they might mean in Mississippi Law in order to apply their meaning to the matters over which it has jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs have asserted that these terms mean that Bishop Rodi, a Defendant, is a Trustee of a Trust of which Plaintiffs are beneficiaries as "Members," and that therefore a fiduciary relationship exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants, which Defendants have breached. This assertion fails on all counts:

1. As has been shown, regardless of language in conveyance documents, Bishop Rodi is not a "Trustee" within the meaning of Title 91, Plaintiffs have failed to show any other meaning recognizable under Mississippi Law

2. Plaintiffs have failed to show that a Trust exists under Title 91 or any other Mississippi Statute.

3. Plaintiffs have not shown that they are "Members" in any sense other than any other "Members" of Holy Family Parish.

4. Absent the existence of a Trust under Title 91, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any sort of fiduciary relationship exists between Defendants and themselves.

Therefore, absent demonstration of any other meaning of the terms "use and benefit" and "Members," this Court may consider the meaning to be that which a reasonable person would assume, namely, that the Church Site must be used to provide some benefit, appropriate to a religious organization, to the Plaintiffs and also to the other Members of Holy Family Parish, whoever they may happen to be.

What that benefit might be, and how it might benefit the Congregation of Holy Family Parish, is a religious matter into which this Court is not permitted to inquire. It is also not a matter of interest to this Court concerning who might determine what those benefits are.